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  I 
Summary	  
Major accidents at offshore installations initiate discussions concerning offshore safety 
management. The Macondo blowout in the Gulf of Mexico is a recent example of that. 
 
In Norway the governing safety philosophy is the energy-barrier concept. It comprises the 
perception of risk as harmful energy that has to be contained and prevented from reaching a 
valuable target. Preventing and mitigating measures are then denoted as barriers. The barriers 
are constructed in a linear manner to form a defence in depth. 
 
The paradox with the energy-barrier concept is that each added barrier increases the 
complexity in the barrier system. Another perception of risk is that it is an emerging property 
of complex systems. Such systems may be prone to have so-called normal accidents. These 
are accidents to be viewed as a property of the system. So, the intention to strengthen the 
defence may actually increase the risk level due to complex interactions within the system. 
 
The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) has raised the matter of dependencies within 
barrier systems during 2013. Prescriptive documents of today contain only short notes on 
interfaces within the barrier system. In addition to that, the governing energy-barrier concept 
does not provide tools for interpretation of interdependencies in the barrier system. Part of the 
purpose of this thesis was therefore too see if interdependencies in barrier systems constitute 
a problem that is essential to approach. It was concluded that there is a need to approach the 
issue and that the PSA prioritizes a relevant matter. 
 
The purpose of this thesis was also to apply a method to interpret interdependencies in a 
barrier system on an offshore platform and then evaluate the application of that method. A 
literature study was conducted to outline the required characteristics of the method to apply 
to interpret dependencies. The method should promote a holistic perspective and account for 
non-linearity. It should also conform to the perception that risks may emerge due to 
complexity. The method chosen was the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM). 
This method was then applied in an analysis of the fire fighting function on an offshore 
platform. The fire fighting function was said to comply with standards and regulations. 
 
The FRAM as it was applied in this thesis can be divided into two major steps. The first was 
the identification and description of functions regarded as relevant for the fire fighting 
function. The second step comprised the analysis of variability and functional resonance in 
instantiations of the model that was created during the identification of functions. The 
evaluation of the application of the method consisted of a discussion that treated the two 
major steps of the FRAM separately. The impressions from the application of the FRAM 
were also different with regard to the two parts. The analysis of variability and functional 
resonance was rewarding and easy to comprehend. The concepts of variability and functional 
resonance made the interpretation of complex interactions workable and possible to visualize. 
The identification phase was on the other hand characterized by difficulties and uncertainties. 
This step is important and lays the foundation for the analysis since the boundaries of the 
system are defined with regard to the identified functions. The main issue was the level of 
detail (degree of decomposition) in the descriptions of the functions. It is indeed a feature of a 
complex system that it is hard to model but the identification phase in the FRAM probably 
has to undergo further development. It is important that the model is reliable since it 
constitutes the foundation for the analysis of variability and functional resonance.  
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Sammanfattning	  
När större olyckor inträffar på offshore-anläggningar runtom i världen aktualiseras 
diskussioner kring rådande säkerhetsstrategier. Explosionen på plattformen Deepwater 
Horizon i Mexikanska golfen är ett exempel på en sådan händelse.  
 
Den styrande principen för säkerhet i norsk offshore-verksamhet är energi-barriärkonceptet. I 
den filosofin betraktas risk som skadlig energi som måste hindras från att nå ett värdefullt 
mål. Barriärer konstrueras då för att förebygga olyckor och begränsa konsekvenserna ifall de 
ändå skulle inträffa. Barriärerna bildar ett djupförsvar som ska säkerställa funktionen även 
om en barriär fallerar. 
 
Det finns en paradox med energi-barriärkonceptet och det är att varje barriär som tillförs ökar 
komplexiteten i barriärsystemet. Risk kan ses på olika sätt, förutom att se den som skadlig 
energi så kan man se den som en produkt av komplexitet. I takt med att komplexiteten ökar i 
ett system så ökar också risken för normala olyckor. Dessa olyckor klassas då som en 
egenskap hos systemet snarare än ett resultat av skadlig energi. Därmed kan alltså avsikten att 
stärka barriärsystemet leda till att risknivån ökar på grund av komplexa interaktioner inom 
systemet. 
 
Petroleumtilsynet i Norge har lyft frågan om beroenden inom barriärsystem under 2013. 
Dagens standarder och riktlinjer innehåller endast korta notiser om beroenden inom 
barriärsystemet. Utöver detta så kan inte energi-barriärkonceptet användas för att tolka 
beroenden, det innehåller inte de analytiska verktyg som behövs. Därför är en del av syftet 
med detta examensarbete att undersöka ifall Petroleumtilsynets fokusering på beroenden är 
relevant. Slutsatsen rörande denna del av syftet är att Petroleumtilsynet fokuserar på ett 
väsentligt ämnesområde när de lyfter frågan om beroenden inom barriärsystem. 
 
Syftet med detta examensarbete är också att tillämpa en metod för att tolka beroenden inom 
ett barriärsystem på en offshoreplattform och sedan utvärdera tillämpningen av metoden. En 
litteraturstudie genomfördes för att ta reda på vilka egenskaper som krävs hos en metod som 
används för att tolka beroenden. Metoden bör främja ett helhetsperspektiv och ta hänsyn till 
icke-linjäritet. Den bör också härstamma från uppfattningen om att risk kan vara en produkt 
av komplexitet. Metoden som valdes för tillämpning var Functional Resonance Analysis 
Method (FRAM). Denna metod tillämpades sedan i en analys av det aktiva brandskyddet på 
en offshoreplattform. Det aktiva brandskyddet antogs följa gällande föreskrifter. 
 
FRAM tillämpades i två steg i detta examensarbete. Första steget gällde identifiering och 
beskrivning av funktioner som ansågs relevanta för det aktiva brandskyddet. I det andra 
steget analyserades variabilitet och funktionell resonans i tillämpningar av den modell som 
konstruerades när funktionerna identifierades. Intrycken från tillämpningen av FRAM 
diskuterades i två steg i enlighet med tillämpningen av metoden. Analysen av variabilitet och 
funktionell resonans var givande och förståelig. Variabilitet och funktionell resonans som 
begrepp möjliggjorde också tolkning och visualisering av komplexa interaktioner. 
Identifieringsfasen präglades dock av svårigheter och osäkerheter. Identifieringen är viktig 
och lägger grunden för den fortsatta analysen eftersom systemets gränser definieras relativt 
de identifierade funktionerna. Svårigheten var bland annat relaterad till detaljnivån (grad av 
reduktion) i beskrivningarna av funktionerna. Ett komplext system är svårt att modellera, 
trots det bör verktygen för identifiering av funktioner i FRAM fortsätta utvecklas. Det är 
viktigt att modellen är tillförlitlig eftersom den utgör underlag för analysen av variabilitet och 
funktionell resonans.	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1 Introduction	  
Safety on offshore oil and gas platforms has attracted attention during the recent years. The 
Macondo blowout in the Gulf of Mexico, where the rig Deepwater Horizon exploded, is one 
example of when severe consequences were encountered. There is also a recent example of 
when the absence of an ignition source was the only circumstance preventing a hydrocarbon 
release from igniting at the platform Snorre A (SINTEF, 2010). Another aspect appearing in 
the media is the petroleum exploration in the arctic regions. The environment is considered to 
be more sensitive in those areas. The arctic exploration is therefore a challenge to safety 
management, e.g. because of the more demanding surroundings in general. Hence there are 
both recent accidents and future challenges that actualize the issue of offshore safety. 
 
Accidents such as the Macondo blowout initiate critical discussions concerning the current 
safety management strategies used in the offshore industry. These discussions are necessary 
for the development of the strategies and concern several issues. When are the weak spots 
induced during the lifetime of an offshore platform? Is it during the design of the platform, 
during the construction or during the operational phase? These are questions that imply that 
there is something wrong at the platform, e.g. bad design, wrongful installations or wrong 
procedures. But, on any given day in general, the platform actually functions as intended, 
which implies that everything is correct. So why do things get out of hand sometimes? Why 
are the efforts made today in the name of safety apparently not sufficient? 
 
Nearly thirty years ago Perrow (1984) argued that certain systems are prone to have what he 
called normal accidents. These are accidents that are to be seen as a property of such systems. 
According to Perrow (1984) there are two concepts that characterizes a system that is prone 
to have normal accidents, these are complex interactions and tight couplings. Perrow's theory 
implies that accidents need to be understood as a result of interactions, relations and 
interdependencies in a system. 
 
The concept of barriers is the governing principle of safety management on the Norwegian 
continental shelf today (PSA, 2013a). This means that design is considered safe when it 
complies with the philosophy of a defence in depth, with several layers that forms a 
protection against harmful energy (PSA, 2013a). Hence the concept of barriers is rooted in 
the linear thinking of symmetrical cause and effect relationships (Hollnagel, 2004). 
 
Perrow (1984) argues that it is virtually impossible to construct a defence in depth without 
increasing complexity when a barrier is added. What Perrow (1984) says is basically that the 
construction of a defence in this manner increases the number of potential interactions 
between such barriers, i.e. complexity, and therefore also increases the potential for normal 
accidents. 
 
The Petroleum Safety Authority in Norway (PSA) has raised the matter of barrier 
interdependencies as a focus area during 2013 in an attempt to increase the understanding of 
the implications of those dependencies (PSA, 2013b). Standards and guidelines applicable 
during the design of barrier systems are based upon functional requirements for each barrier. 
However, the matter of interdependencies in the barrier system gets little space. For each 
barrier there is a short note on interfaces with other barriers but it says practically nothing 
about the actual nature of the potential interdependencies. 
 
As stated above, dependencies can be characterized with complex interactions and tight 
couplings. Hence they are features of system complexity. There are several voices that 
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encourage the use of a concept that is different from the governing barrier concept when the 
purpose is to interpret dependencies. It is not sufficient to apply a linear method to approach 
the interdependencies in a system. The method used to interpret interdependencies in a 
system should be non-linear and stem from a systemic view on accident modelling (Dekker, 
2011; Hollnagel, 2012; Perrow, 1984). 
 
Summing up, according to Perrow (1984), the key to understand accidents lies in the 
interpretation of dependencies. There is a governmental wish for an increased understanding 
of dependencies but the governing concept is based on a linear reasoning of cause and effect. 
There is clearly a discrepancy between the wish for increased understanding and the attention 
paid to dependencies today. Furthermore, the governing concept of today is not capable of 
interpreting dependencies and to increase the understanding. There is a need to apply a 
different method that takes complex interactions and non-linearity into account. 
 
1.1 Purpose	  
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate if interdependencies in barrier systems is an 
essential problem to approach. The purpose is also to apply a method to interpret 
interdependencies in a barrier system on an offshore platform and then evaluate the 
application of that method. The level of attention paid to interfaces and dependencies in 
prescriptive documents, e.g. NORSOK S-001 (2008), does not seem to embrace the 
assumption that risks and accidents are emergent properties of complex interactions and 
relations. Hence the purpose of this thesis is to approach this issue. The initial literature 
review will outline the rationale behind the choice of specific modelling method. The 
concluding evaluation will focus on the possibilities that the method provides for the analyst 
to interpret dependencies and the implications they may give rise to according to Perrow 
(1984). Impressions and reflections during the work process will also be discussed. 
 
The purpose is operationalized into three major research questions to structure the work with 
this thesis: 
 
• Are interdependencies in a barrier system a problem that is essential to approach? 
• Which are the required characteristics of a method applied to interpret, problematize 
and discuss barrier interdependencies? 
• What are the impressions from an application of a method that conforms to those 
requirements? 
 
By answering the above questions it will be possible to present the theoretical background 
related to dependencies in complex systems and to discuss the results and impressions from 
the application of a method. It will also be possible to assess the criticality of the issue of 
interdependencies. 
 
1.2 Limitations	  
Since the network of barriers on an offshore platform is extensive it will not be possible to 
perform a thorough analysis of the entire barrier system. Therefore this thesis is constructed 
as a case study focusing on one specific function within the system. The target for analysis 
will be the function with the purpose to fight fires, both automatically and manually. The 
choice of the fire fighting function as the target for the analysis is made because of the well-
defined energy it is supposed to combat, namely fires and explosions. Threats from fires and 
explosions are tightly related to the extraction of hydrocarbons from wells deep underground. 
The fire fighting function is therefore a given function in the protection on an offshore 
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platform. The author's background in fire protection engineering is also an argument for 
choosing the fire fighting function since it increases the probability of a good analysis. 
 
Cilliers (2005) presents a set of attributes that characterizes a complex system, one of the 
attributes is that it is the interactions between components that defines the state of the system. 
This thesis focuses on interdependencies in a barrier system. Hence it is natural to state that 
the system modelling will be supported by complexity theory in the thesis. It means that the 
fire fighting function will be defined as open to the surrounding system environment (Cilliers, 
2005). It also means that there are other ways to describe the system than the one chosen in 
this thesis, Cilliers (2005) puts it like this: "[…] the knowledge gained by any description is 
always relative to the perspective from which the description was made." (p. 258). The latter 
quote is indeed the core of this thesis since the idea is to adopt a certain perspective on safety. 
The method to be applied has a functional approach, this is crucial and means that the focus 
lies on how things happen instead of why (Hollnagel, 2012). The limitation differs from the 
traditional view on how to limit the space of analysis since it is about defining a starting point 
and letting the boundaries reveal themselves during the process. This will only be partially 
possible within the frames of this thesis. Hence it is necessary to control the boundaries in 
this thesis to ensure that the system will be interpretable. Interfaces to systems that are not 
explicitly part of the fire fighting function will be assumed to be static to their nature. The 
system may therefore be seen as semi-open to the surrounding system environment. 
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2 The	  Norwegian	  offshore	  industry	  
The Norwegian offshore industry has grown to be both the largest industry in Norway and the 
largest contributor to Norwegian welfare (Alveberg & Vaage Melberg, 2013). Interesting 
numbers describing the offshore industry in Norway can be viewed in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1. Numbers, Norwegian offshore industry (Alveberg & Vaage Melberg, 2013). 
NOK 9000 billion net revenue since 1971. 
76 productive fields as of today. 
Total export of 225,14 million m3 oil equivalents in 2012. 
23 per cent of total gain in Norway in 2012. 
7th largest oil exporter in 2011. 
3rd largest gas exporter in 2011. 
 
2.1 Safety	  within	  the	  Norwegian	  offshore	  industry	  
The governing authority for safety in petroleum related activities is the Petroleum Safety 
Authority (PSA). In the document Principles for barrier management in the petroleum 
industry (PSA, 2013a), the PSA states the following: 
As the HSE regulations make clear, barriers represent a key element in reducing risk 
on both offshore- and land based installations. Requirements for barriers are rooted 
in the "energy and barrier" perspective, which encourages a separation between 
hazardous energy and assets such as life, health, the natural environment and 
material facilities. (p. 4). 
The PSA has also defined four different focus areas that will benefit from increased priority 
during 2013. One of the areas is barriers and one of their arguments for prioritizing this area 
is: "We in the PSA see a need for better understanding of the interaction between operational, 
organisational and technical elements in barriers." (PSA, 2013b). 
 
Given the quotes above it is natural to conclude that barriers are the key elements in safety 
management in the Norwegian offshore industry. 
 
2.1.1 Governing	  documents	  
The governing document for risk assessments is NORSOK Z-013 (NORSOK, 2010), in the 
section about general requirements for risk assessments the following is stated: 
Establishing the context covers all activities carried out and all measures 
implemented prior to or as a part of the initiating phase of a risk assessment process, 
with the intention of ensuring that the risk assessment process to be performed is 
a) suitable with respect to its intended objectives and purpose, 
b) executed with a suitable scope and level of quality, 
c) tailored to the facility, system(s), operations, etc. of interest, 
d) tailored to the required and available level of detail. (p. 19). 
Item a) above is particularly interesting, given the PSA's intention to increase awareness of 
interactions in barrier systems, it is vital that the applied analysis method corresponds to the 
requirement in a) by paying enough attention to interactions. 
 
The governing document on a technical level is NORSOK S-001 (NORSOK, 2008). The 
standard outlines the functional requirements for each barrier element in a barrier system. 
There are short notes on interfaces and dependencies but no information on the actual nature 
of those interactive features. Extensive information regarding the fire fighting functions is 
also given in the standard ISO 13702 (ISO, 1999). 
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3 Theoretical	  background	  
Statements and regulations from the PSA shows that the energy-barrier perspective is 
dominating within the offshore industry, the safety system on an offshore platform is 
therefore designed to conform to this philosophy. The question is if the governing energy-
barrier principle is compatible with the PSA's desire for: "[…] better understanding of the 
interaction between operational, organisational and technical elements in barriers." (PSA, 
2013b). 
 
Interaction is the keyword in the quote above, but is the governing barrier principle based on 
an accident model that provides sufficient tools for interpreting dependencies within complex 
systems such as barrier systems? This chapter summarizes the theoretical foundation to this 
thesis. Firstly a description of the barrier concept is made, which is the current principle 
guiding safety work in the Norwegian offshore industry. Following is a presentation of 
attributes of complex accident models. The presentation of the different perspectives on how 
to deal with systems safety is intended to be polarizing and highlight the differences. A 
historical perspective on system dynamics modelling and an introduction to the method that 
will be applied in this thesis is given lastly. 
 
3.1 The	  current	  philosophy	  
As stated in section 2.1, the use of barriers is central in Norwegian offshore safety 
management. Barriers can be either preventive or protective, either they prevent an event 
from occurring or they mitigate the consequences if it occurs anyway (Hollnagel, 2004). The 
underlying mentality is that harmful energy from a source of danger shall be prevented from 
reaching a valuable target. A common model used to explain the mechanisms of barrier 
systems is the Swiss cheese model (Reason, 1997). The model illustrates a defence in depth, 
which basically means a linear construction of multiple barriers to protect a defined target 
from harmful energy. The failure of one barrier is therefore no longer crucial for safety since 
another barrier stands in line to battle the energy (Reason, 1997). The Swiss cheese model 
highlights that there are weaknesses in each protective layer. The weaknesses are 
metaphorically described as the holes in a slice of Swiss cheese, hence the name of the model, 
allowing the harmful energy to pass through the slice of cheese. If the holes in the layers are 
aligned, the energy will be able pass through all barriers and reach the target (Reason, 1997). 
 
The origin of barriers is the concept of harmful energy, meaning that energy is transferred in 
a way that causes damage to a target (Haddon, 1973). The target may then be protected by 
what Haddon (1973) denotes as countermeasures. These countermeasures range from the 
initial prevention of hazardous energy formations to re-establishment of the normal state. The 
energy release theory represents a linear reasoning of cause and effect. The basic principle of 
such causality is that one thing leads to another (Hollnagel, 2012). Hence an accident is said 
to be a result of a linear series of events (Hollnagel, 2004). The energy release theory has 
been developed into more complex linear models that expand the space of analysis by taking 
additional factors into account. These models are denoted as epidemiological models 
(Hollnagel, 2004). The additional factors are then added to the search for the root cause of a 
chronological series of events that leads to an accident (Hollnagel, 2004). Hollnagel (2004) 
means that four characteristics of epidemiological models generally separates them from 
simpler cause and effect models. These are performance deviations, environmental conditions, 
barriers and latent conditions (Hollnagel, 2004). Performance deviations refer to deviations in 
general without prejudice, the expression comprises e.g. technical failures and human errors. 
Environmental conditions pay respect to the surrounding environment, acknowledging that 
these may produce performance deviations. Barriers to prevent or protect from unwanted 
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consequences, they may be applied throughout the entire progress of an accident. Latent 
conditions are defined as built-in features of a system that may lead to an accident at some 
time (Hollnagel, 2004). 
 
The Swiss cheese is a kind of epidemiological model and is to be seen as a response to a need 
for more complex models than simple, sequential, models (Hollnagel, 2004). The holes in the 
barriers in the Swiss cheese model are examples of additional factors included to expand the 
space of analysis. In the model, they are considered to be active failures or latent conditions 
connected to each single barrier in the defence. These are the features that define the Swiss 
cheese model as an epidemiological model. Active failures are said to be human actions that 
are not safe and which affects safety directly. Latent conditions has a more organizational 
profile and is said to be due to a complex working environment according to Reason (1997). 
 
3.2 An	  alternative	  approach	  
An important distinction between the energy barrier concept and the concept that is 
introduced in this section is the perception of what risk is. Where Haddon (1973) sees risk as 
an hazardous energy that has to be contained, Perrow (1984) views it as a product of 
complexity. These different views turns out to be interrelated since the paradox with the 
barrier concept is that each added barrier in a system may increase the risk in the system as a 
whole due to increased complexity (Perrow, 1984). Furthermore, on complexity related to 
defences in depth, Reason (1997) acknowledges that: "One of their more unfortunate 
consequences is that they make systems more complex, and hence more opaque, to the 
people who manages and operate them." (p. 8). So, if the governing principle makes the 
safety system more opaque, how can it be approached for interpretation? There is a need for 
another perspective on the mechanisms of a barrier system. This section presents thoughts on 
risks as a product of complexity and introduces the systemic accident model as an alternative 
to the current perception. 
 
The issues of risks due to complexity is not new, Perrow (1984) discussed high-risk systems 
almost thirty years ago in the book Normal accidents: living with high-risk technologies and 
concluded that complexity is a natural attribute of present systems. In the book it is suggested 
that neither organizational nor technical safety measures can protect a system from what is 
called normal accidents (or system accidents as Perrow also denotes it). Instead, Perrow 
(1984) states that both organizational and technical safety measures increases the complexity 
and therefore also the probability of accidents that are to be viewed as normal. These are 
accidents that emerge due to a system's complex nature. Perrow (1984) introduces two 
concepts that affect the risk of normal accidents: Complex interactions and tight coupling. 
Those concepts might in combination produce a situation that is potentially disastrous. The 
meaning of complex interactions is, according to Perrow (1984), that failure of multiple 
components might have consequences that are impossible to foresee. Tight coupling means 
that a process is designed in a way that makes it impossible to handle a failed component 
separately, which affects the process safety in general. Hence the occurrences of normal 
accidents is an attribute of a system, it does not say anything about the frequency of such 
accidents (Perrow, 1984). This means that there is no prediction in time in the normal 
accident theory since it only states that certain systems are prone to having them. The 
Perrowian theory of normal accidents is almost thirty years old, yet the major principles 
guiding safety management today, e.g. Swiss cheese model, pays little attention to concepts 
as complex interactions and tight couplings. 
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The view on complex interactions is shared by Dekker (2011) who says that every additional 
layer from a defence in depth strategy increases the number of connections within the system 
significantly. Dekker (2011) also discusses the concept of complex interactions: 
Interactive complexity refers to component interactions that are non-linear, unfamiliar, 
unexpected or unplanned, and either not visible or not immediately comprehensible 
for people running the system. Linear interactions among components, in contrast, 
are those expected and familiar production or maintenance sequences, and those 
that are visible and understandable even if they were unplanned. But complex 
interactions produce unfamiliar consequences, or unplanned and unexpected 
sequences, that are either not visible or not immediately comprehensible. (p. 128). 
Dekker (2011) states that the philosophy of hunting causes corresponds to a traditional view 
on analysis based on reductionism. The idea of this perspective is to analyse a system by 
reducing it, a system's behaviour will then be explained by the functioning of its parts 
(Dekker, 2011). Dekker (2011) means that an analysis method corresponding to the 
reductionist perspective narrows the space of possible interpretations. That is, because of the 
focus on the parts of the system rather than the interactions within the system. A reductionist 
perspective is not able to provide a complex interpretation and therefore it is not sufficient to 
apply such a simplifying method in complex cases (Dekker, 2011). 
 
As stated above, epidemiological accident modelling involves active failures and latent 
conditions. It is though a reductionist model based on the assumption of linear cause and 
effect. Methods relying on this accident model have limited capacity when it comes to 
complex interpretations of a system. Instead, the applied method has to be based on a non-
linear systemic accident model that focuses on tight couplings and complex interactions and 
sees the system as a whole. Lundberg, Rollenhagen and Hollnagel (2009) also promote a 
non-reductionist and holistic view that is in line with the views presented in this section: "To 
focus on the whole it is necessary to use a more systemic model that goes from the whole to 
different factors involved in accidents (top–down), rather than the other way around (bottom–
up)." (p. 1310). This is a way to widen the space of analysis and enable complex 
interpretations. 
 
An important distinction between epidemiological and systemic models is how accidents are 
characterized. In an epidemiological model an accident can be denoted as a resultant because 
of the explanation provided by reductionism and causality. In a systemic model accidents are 
seen as emergent instead of resultant. That is because the explaining principles in the 
epidemiological model are incapable of interpreting the mechanisms that generates the 
outcome (Hollnagel, 2012). A figurative comparison between resultant and emergent events 
generates a picture that permeates the disparities in general. A resultant implies that there are 
mechanistic arrows and forces that add up to a resulting event. An emergent phenomenon 
seems to be a product of a dynamically bubbling and ever-changing environment. In a way 
this is the picture of the fundamental difference between the perspectives cooked down to the 
bottom line. The adoption of a non-linear systemic model is therefore in line with the 
thoughts Perrow introduced almost thirty years ago, seeing normal accidents as an emergent 
product of complex interactions and tight coupling. Hence this thesis' focus on interpreting 
such complex interactions in the systems designed to guarantee safe operations.  
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3.3 System	  dynamics	  modelling	  
The system dynamics modelling that is necessary for the interpretation of dependencies in 
complex socio-technical systems can be traced back to the 1960s. Maruyama (1963) 
introduced the concept of the second cybernetics1 which was a development of the concept of 
cybernetics that was introduced by Wiener (1948). Where cybernetics focuses on the 
counteraction of deviancy, the second cybernetics also involves amplification of deviancy. 
The difference is that the counteraction rely on negative feedback between elements in a 
system and the amplification on rely on positive feedback (Maruyama, 1963). Maruyama 
(1963) also states that the feedbacks in a system are mutual and therefore the reasoning of 
causality has to be questioned in favour of a non-linear reasoning, i.e. that a given condition 
may not result in a product with similar magnitude as the condition. These thoughts were 
presented half a century ago, yet the dominating concept has been of a linear nature since the 
second cybernetics were introduced (Hollnagel, 2012). With the conceptual framework of 
today, a method that corresponds to the philosophy of the second cybernetics would be 
denoted as dynamic and non-linear (Hollnagel, 2012). 
 
Several methods has developed on a basis of the second cybernetics but in this thesis it is 
assumed to be sufficient to present the origin of the philosophy of system dynamics 
modelling. Hence no inventory of methods that corresponds to this philosophy is produced 
and only one of the methods will be introduced further. That is the FRAM (Functional 
Resonance Analysis Method), which is a method that is conceptually derived from the second 
cybernetics (Hollnagel, 2012). 
 
3.3.1 The	  FRAM	  
The FRAM approaches a system from a functional perspective (Hollnagel, 2012). The 
concept of functional variability is central in the FRAM and it is acknowledged that this is a 
feature that is crucial within a system. The idea of the FRAM is therefore to identify 
performance variability that may induce functional resonance to be able to handle it in an 
optimal manner. That is, amplifying positive outcomes and dampening bad ones. Therefore 
the system's intended state is of interest and there is no initial need for an accident or a 
scenario to start applying the FRAM. The basic principle guiding the reasoning within the 
FRAM is that it is the same mechanisms that leads to both wanted and unwanted outcomes 
(Hollnagel, 2012). Due to the functional profile of the FRAM, the notion of components is 
replaced by the notion of functions in the syntax. The FRAM offers a step-by-step approach 
to the interpretation of complex systems. 
 
The FRAM relies on four basic principles that pervades the way of thinking when applying 
the method (Hollnagel, 2012): 
 
• The equivalence of failure and success. Meaning that the same mechanisms lead to 
either the desired outcome or an accident. 
• The approximate adjustments. Everyday activities are always adjusted to the current 
conditions. These adjustments generate performance variability. 
• All outcomes are to be seen as emergent instead of resultant. The latter implies that 
the outcome is a result of a reasoning based on causality. 
                                                
1 Cybernetics: "the science of communications and automatic control systems in both machines and living 
things." (Oxford Dictionaries) 
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• The use of functional resonance to describe relations and dependencies in a set of 
functions during a specified event. 
 
3.4 Conclusion	  
The FRAM approaches a system with the intention of understanding everyday performance 
and has the system as the starting point for the analysis. Because of this there is no need for 
an accident or a scenario initially. The system is subject to analysis with regard to an actual 
scenario at a later stage in the process, it is referred to as an instantiation of the system's state 
given a defined context (Hollnagel, 2012). With regard to these features, there are several 
arguments for applying the FRAM. Firstly, it is applicable to a wide range of situations, both 
retrospective and prospective analysis. Secondly, it focuses on the description of the system 
rather than individual components. Finally, the setup corresponds to the requirements of a 
method that is to be applied to interpret dependencies in complex systems according to 
section 3.2. 
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4 Method	  
This chapter accounts for the approach in this thesis and an overview of the work process can 
be viewed in Figure 4.1. An initial literature review was performed to enable formulation of 
the background to the thesis and the research questions. The results from the initial review 
directed the focus during an extended literature review that aimed to respond to the research 
question concerning the required characteristics of the method to be applied. According to 
findings accounted for in chapter 3 the method to apply to interpret dependencies should stem 
from a systemic accident model and account for non-linearity and emergence. Hence the 
method chosen was a system dynamics modelling tool called FRAM, which is presented in 
FRAM: the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (Hollnagel, 2012). The application of the 
FRAM is accounted for in the upcoming section. In an effort to validate the findings a focus 
group, consisting of safety management experts from Det Norske Veritas (DNV), was given 
the opportunity to provide feedback for a preliminary version of the analysis. The discussion 
primarily comprised the identified functions that formed the model. The intention was to try 
the validity of the model from a reality based perspective influenced by experience and 
knowledge of systems similar to the one in this thesis. Since the purpose of this thesis was to 
evaluate the application of the applied method, the concluding discussion treated the 
impressions from the application, not the outcomes of the analysis. The outcomes of the 
analysis were instead accounted for in connection with the last step of the analysis. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. The work process in this thesis. 
 
4.1 Application	  of	  the	  FRAM	  
The FRAM offers the methodology that guided the modelling of the system and the 
interpretation of barrier interdependencies. The rest of this chapter accounts for the 
application of the different steps in that method during the process of interpreting 
dependencies. 
 
4.1.1 Identification	  and	  description	  of	  functions	  
The initial task in the application of the FRAM was to define the level of detail in the 
descriptions of the identified functions. It was therefore a question of defining what was to be 
seen as relevant during the analysis and laid the foundation for the upcoming work. The 
reasoning behind the level of detail in this thesis was qualitative and supported by ISO 13702 
(ISO, 1999) and NORSOK S-001 (NORSOK, 2008). The analysed overall function was fire 
fighting and the limiting precondition for the identification of functions was that there was a 
fire in progress on the platform. The identification began from two functions that were seen 
as analytically relevant with regard to fire fighting, namely automatic fire fighting and 
manual fire fighting. All the functions were described on a level that communicated the 
intended purpose of each function. The identification continued until the occurrence of a 
function whose Output had no effect on a function within the system in question (Hollnagel, 
2012, p. 59). The limitations in this thesis clearly affected the identification phase. It could 
have continued until the entire safety system was modelled but the modelling was constrained 
so that the model could be kept within the limitations. The functions considered as end points 
in the system either delivered a figurative Output or received an input from functions that lay 
Perform	  initial	  literature	  review	  
Formulate	  problem	  and	  questions	  
Perform	  extended	  literature	  review	   Choose	  method	  to	  apply	   Apply	  method	   Validate	  [indings	  
Discuss	  outcomes	  and	  answer	  questions	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outside the limitations of this thesis. This was to show that the system was open to the 
surrounding system environment. 
 
To maintain consistency and facilitate navigation in the inventory of functions the so-called 
FRAM frame was used as it is presented in Table 4.1. The layout of Table 4.1 was used each 
time functions were represented. Explanatory tables adopted the layout of Table 4.2. The 
FRAM frame facilitated the identification of additional relevant functions by suggesting one 
outgoing and five ingoing threads that could be followed to identify additional functions. A 
description of the reasoning behind the aspects of each function was presented in conjunction 
with the frame for each function. The functional requirements related to a function were then 
briefly summarized in succession to the descriptions of the functions. Some aspects were not 
described initially due to their nature, e.g. Time requires that the function is put in a context 
but there is no sequencing of the functions in the FRAM model. Those aspects were denoted 
as N/A initially but were then discussed in the instantiations of the model. When the 
functions were discussed they were written in the following style: <Function>. 
 
Table 4.1. The FRAM frame (Hollnagel, 2012, p. 56). 
Name of function 
 Aspect Description of aspect 
Input (I)  
Output (O)  
Precondition (P)  
Resource (R)  
Control (C)  
Time (T)  
 
The aspects in Table 4.1 is written with a capital first letter here, in line with the syntax in 
Hollnagel (2012, p. 47), this means that an input was categorized as Input, Precondition, 
Resource, Control or Time during the analysis. Every function had an Output that served as 
some sort of input to other functions. Explanations to the different aspects are provided in 
Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2. The six aspects that describes a function (Hollnagel, 2012, p. 46). 
Input (I) That which the function processes or transforms or that which starts the function. 
Output (O) That which is the result of the function, either an entity or a state change. 
Preconditions (P) Conditions that must exist before a function can be carried out. 
Resources (R) That which the function needs when it is carried out (Execution Condition) or consumes to produce the Output. 
Time (T) Temporal constraints affecting the function (with regard to starting time, finishing time or duration). 
Control (C) How the function is monitored or controlled. 
 
There was no specific scenario involved during the identification of functions (Hollnagel, 
2012, p. 55). The couplings accounted for during the identification were therefore only 
potential couplings. Specific scenarios and actual couplings were accounted for in 
instantiations of the model at a later stage in the analysis (Hollnagel, 2012, p. 55). Twelve 
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functions were identified as presented in Table 4.3. The potential couplings as they emerged 
during the identification are also listed for clarity. The list is in no particular order. 
 
Table 4.3. Identified functions and potential couplings from/to other functions. 
Function Potential couplings from/to other functions (Aspect) 
Fight fire automatically 
Interpret fire detection (I) 
Automatically detect fire (P) 
Manually observe fire (P) 
Provide extinguishing agent (R) 
Supervise from control room (C) 
Communicate (C) 
Fight fire manually 
Activate alarm (I) 
Manually observe fire (I) 
Install and maintain (P) 
Provide extinguishing agent (R) 
Supervise from control room (C) 
Communicate (C) 
Interpret fire detection 
Automatically detect fire (I) 
Fight fire automatically (O) 
Install and maintain (P) 
Provide emergency power (R) 
Supervise from control room (C) 
Automatically detect fire 
Interpret fire detection (O) 
Install and maintain (P) 
Provide emergency power (R) 
Supervise from control room (C) 
Manually observe fire 
Activate alarm (O) 
Fight fire manually (O) 
Supervise from control room (C) 
Communicate (C) 
Provide extinguishing agent 
Start firewater pump (I) 
Fight fire automatically (O) 
Fight fire manually (O) 
Supervise from control room (C) 
Supervise from control room 
All functions (I) 
Communicate (P) 
Provide emergency power (R) 
Install and maintain 
(background function) Design of system and maintenance routines (O) 
Provide emergency power 
Interpret fire detection (I) 
Activate alarm (I) 
Interpret fire detection (O) 
Automatically detect fire (O) 
Activate alarm (O) 
Communicate (O) 
Install and maintain (P) 
Supervise from control room (C, O) 
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Function Potential couplings from/to other functions (Aspect) 
Activate alarm 
Interpret fire detection (I) 
Manually observe fire (I) 
Supervise from control room (O) 
Install and maintain (P) 
Provide emergency power (R) 
Supervise from control room (C) 
Communicate (C) 
Start firewater pump 
Interpret fire detection (I) 
Activate alarm (I) 
Provide extinguishing agent (O) 
Install and maintain (P) 
Supervise from control room (C) 
Communicate (C) 
Communicate 
Fight fire automatically (I) 
Fight fire manually (I) 
Manually observe fire (I) 
Supervise from control room (I, O) 
Activate alarm (I) 
Install and maintain (P) 
Provide emergency power (R) 
Supervise from control room (C) 
 
The identification of functions was a process based on assumptions and reasoning about 
which functions that could be considered relevant. The functions were then matched against 
the governing standards ISO 13702 (ISO, 1999) and NORSOK S-001 (NORSOK, 2008) to 
obtain knowledge of the design of the system. The list in Table 4.3 represents a summary of 
the FRAM model, more detailed descriptions are provided in chapter 5. A function can also 
be represented graphically. In a graphical representation, each function is represented by the 
hexagon in Figure 4.2. Each corner is dedicated to one of the six aspects in Table 4.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. The graphical representation of a function (Hollnagel, 2012, p. 46). 
 
The graphical representation primarily communicates the results in an instantiation of the 
model (Hollnagel, 2012, p. 55). A graphical representation of the potential couplings would 
not communicate anything other than that there are many potential couplings among the 
functions (Hollnagel, 2012, p. 55). However, a graphical overview of the identified functions 
without the potential couplings is presented in Figure 4.3. 
Function
P R
I O
T C
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Figure 4.3. Identified functions represented graphically. 
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4.1.2 Variability	  of	  the	  functions	  
The variability concept is dual and comprises the performance variability of the function in 
question and the variability of the Output of that function. The variability of a function can be 
due to internal or external reasons. The variability of the Output of a function formed the 
basis for the concept of functional resonance by putting the function in a context. Functional 
resonance will be accounted for in the next section. The analysis of variability was performed 
backwards since the variability of a function itself was of no interest until the variability of 
the Output of that function had been confirmed (Hollnagel, 2012, p. 63). A thorough 
discussion on the potential variability would be time consuming and full of uncertainties so it 
was concluded that a reversed strategy was more efficient. With regard to this, the variability 
of the functions was analysed in the instantiations of the model. 
 
A function is commonly categorized as technological, human or organizational (Hollnagel, 
2012, p. 65). The identified functions are categorized in Table 4.4. Performance variability 
due to a functions adaption may be either internal, external or due to couplings with other 
functions (Hollnagel, 2012, p. 75). 
 
Table 4.4. Categorization of identified functions. 
Technological Human Organizational 
Fight fire automatically Fight fire manually Install and maintain 
Interpret fire detection Manually observe fire  
Automatically detect fire Supervise from control room  
Provide extinguishing agent Activate alarm  
Provide emergency power Communicate  
Activate alarm   
Start firewater pump   
Communicate   
 
The categorization in Table 4.4 gave a hint on how likely a function was to vary since the 
functions in the different categories were prone to vary to a different extent. Technological 
functions are mostly viewed as stable but may indeed vary due to e.g. software variability or 
physical degradation. Human functions may vary often due to several reasons related to the 
human nature and the variability tends to have rather significant volatility. Organizational 
functions do not vary as often as human but they also vary quite much when it happens 
(Hollnagel, 2012, p. 69). The topics of internal and external variability were quite easy to 
comprehend, internal variability stemmed from mechanisms inside the function and external 
from factors in the surrounding environment. 
 
4.1.3 Functional	  resonance	  
The main question in this thesis is about the interpretation of dependencies. Therefore the 
effect of the variability of an Output of a function is of major interest. It is in the couplings to 
other functions that this variability manifests impact on the system as a whole. This 
aggregation of the variability of the Outputs of the functions is what constitutes the functional 
resonance within a system (Hollnagel, 2012, p. 77). Hence the internal or external reasons to 
the functions variability were of secondary importance. The explanation to why a function 
varied became interesting at first when the variability of the Output was confirmed 
(Hollnagel, 2012, p. 63). The variability of an Output was considered firstly during the 
analysis. The possible reasons to the variability of the function were then discussed if the 
Output varied. 
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At this point the impact of the performance variability of each function was put in a context 
and it was evaluated how the variability of the Output affected other functions. Depending on 
which aspect that received the varying Output from another function, the function in question 
was affected differently. The actual variability of the Output of a function may appear in 
different shapes due to the reason of the variability. Mainly four categories were used to 
characterize the actual variability of an Output of a function, these were as follows (Hollnagel, 
2012, pp. 71-73): 
 
• Timing and duration 
• Force, distance and direction 
• The Output as an object, e.g. the wrong object 
• Ordering or sequencing of the Output, e.g. a function is bypassed 
 
A description of the actual variability of an Output of a function was performed using an 
ordinal scale relating to the anticipated qualities of that Output, e.g. an Output was described 
as too much if it exceeded an expected quantity. If an Output was described with too much 
the variability belonged to the category denoted as Force, distance and direction (Hollnagel, 
2012, p. 72). 
 
If the Output of a function varied, then the varying Output affected the so-called downstream 
functions, i.e. the functions receiving the Output as input in an instantiation of the model 
(Hollnagel, 2012, p. 78). The functional resonance was analysed during the instantiations of 
the model that are accounted for in chapter 6. 
 
4.1.4 Instantiations	  of	  the	  model	  
According to Hollnagel (2012, p. 75), couplings and variability should always be analysed 
with the support of an instantiation of the model. Hollnagel (2012, p. 36) also states that the 
approach in the analysis differs whether the task is an accident investigation or a risk 
assessment. The approach in this thesis was somewhat different since the construction of the 
FRAM model, i.e. the identified functions and the potential couplings, was neither based on 
an accident report nor a specific risk assessment scenario. The model was rather constructed 
on a regulatory basis, i.e. the functional requirements in standards and guidelines were the 
source for the construction of the model. The model was therefore to be seen as an inventory 
of functions relevant for fire fighting. This generic set up was then applied in instantiations of 
the model and only the functions that were involved in each instantiation were accounted for. 
The approach in this thesis was assumed to promote a construction of the model that was 
unconstrained by conditions during a specific case or scenario. According to Hollnagel (2012, 
p. 37), it is an advantage if the model can be constructed without such influence. 
 
The model was applied in instantiations of three cases comprising two events as they 
happened and one risk assessment scenario. The application of the model was systematic and 
referred to the descriptions of each event. An analysis of the variability of the involved 
functions and their Outputs preceded a discussion on what functional resonance it induced in 
the system. Graphical representations of the instantiations then communicated the result of 
the analysis. 
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5 Identification	  and	  description	  of	  functions	  
The identification and description is based on ISO 13702 (ISO, 1999) and NORSOK S-001 
(NORSOK, 2008). These two standards are the documents that are primarily referred to in 
the sections about fire fighting in the guidelines to the facilities regulations (PSA, 2012a). It 
is assumed that design and installation comply with them and the theoretical offshore 
platform is said to be a normally manned installation1. 
 
The construction of the model is independent of the starting point and therefore the FRAM 
provides no guidance on choosing a starting point. This thesis has fire fighting as the overall 
theme so it is vital to define a starting point that generates good preconditions for the 
identification of functions. The initial function should be analytically essential with regard to 
fire fighting (Hollnagel, 2012, p. 42). There are two functions with the objective to fight fires 
and therefore these are assumed to be good candidates to start with. The functions are 
automatic and manual fire fighting. 
 
Table 5.1. Fight fire automatically 
Name of function Fight fire automatically 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Automatic or manual initiation of automatic fire fighting system 
Output Extinguishing agent automatically applied to fire 
Precondition Fire automatically detected 
Resource Extinguishing agent 
Control Monitor development, manual observation, communication 
Time N/A 
 
The Output of the <Fight fire automatically> function described in Table 5.1 is automatic 
application of extinguishing agent against the fire. The Input is the initiation of the automatic 
fire fighting system, which leads to the identification of the functions <Interpret fire 
detection> and <Manually observe fire>. The Precondition is that the fire is automatically 
detected, hence the function <Automatically detect fire> is identified. Resource for the 
function is the extinguishing agent applied to fight the fire. The function <Provide 
extinguishing agent> is therefore identified. The Control aspect comprise monitoring and 
communication and the functions <Supervise from control room> and <Communicate> are 
also identified. Time is not described initially. 
 
Automatic fire fighting system does not have to be installed on the entire platform. The 
requirement is that areas with major fire risks shall be covered, especially areas where 
hydrocarbons are present (NORSOK, 2008). An automatic fire fighting system can be of the 
following types (ISO, 1999): 
 
• Deluge system 
• Water-mist system 
• Foam system 
• Sprinkler system 
• Dry chemical system 
• Gaseous system 
                                                
1 The compliance to governing regulations may vary since the system in question is said to be complex but it is 
an essential simplification in this thesis. Everyday adaptions are though one of the basic principles of the FRAM. 
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According to ISO 13702 (ISO, 1999) the Fire and Explosion Strategy (FES) and governing 
standards shall guide the installation of the fire fighting function. The FES is defined as: 
"Results of the process that uses information from the fire and explosion evaluation to 
determine the measures required to manage these hazardous events and the role of these 
measures." (ISO, 1999, p. 3). The system shall be dimensioned to withstand the assumed fire 
load during a sufficient period of time. A possibility to manually activate the automatic fire 
fighting shall be provided (ISO, 1999). 
 
Table 5.2. Fight fire manually 
Name of function Fight fire manually 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Initiation of manual fire fighting from automatic fire detection or due to manual observation of fire 
Output Extinguishing agent manually applied to fire 
Precondition Fire fighting tools available and maintained 
Resource Extinguishing agent 
Control Monitor development, communication 
Time N/A 
 
The Output of the <Fight fire manually> function described in Table 5.2 is manual 
application of extinguishing agent against the fire. The Input comes either from <Manually 
observe fire> or an alarm that is activated, the function <Activate alarm> is therefore 
identified. The Precondition is that fire fighting tools are available and maintained, hence the 
function <Install and maintain> is identified. The Resource is again the extinguishing agent, 
thus the <Provide extinguishing agent> function. The Control aspect is fulfilled via 
<Supervise from control room> and <Communicate>. Time is not described initially. 
 
Means for manual fire fighting include that any area shall be possible to reach with water 
from two hoses or monitors minimum (NORSOK, 2008). Manual fire fighting equipment 
comprise (ISO, 1999): 
 
• Firewater monitors, i.e. water cannons 
• Hydrants and hoses 
• Portable fire fighting equipment 
 
The equipment above shall be dimensioned to withstand the predicted fire load during a 
sufficient period of time (ISO, 1999). 
 
Table 5.3. Interpret fire detection 
Name of function Interpret fire detection 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Fire is automatically detected 
Output Initiation of automatic fire fighting 
Precondition Detectors deployed and online 
Resource Power 
Control Monitor development, confirm detection 
Time N/A 
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The Output of the <Interpret fire detection> function described in Table 5.3 is initiation of 
automatic fire fighting. The Input comes from <Automatically detect fire>. The Precondition 
is that the detectors are deployed and functional, hence the governing function is <Install and 
maintain>. The Resource required for the function is power and that leads to identification of 
the <Provide emergency power> function. Control is ensured via the <Supervise from control 
room> function. Time is not described initially. 
 
With regard to the overall task of fire detection this function comprises the actions taken of 
the fire detection system when a fire is detected. These actions are (NORSOK, 2008): 
 
• Initiation of automatic fire fighting system 
• Start of firewater pumps 
• Activation of alarm to alert personnel and/or initiate manual fire fighting 
 
The fire detection system shall be functional during a sufficient period of time and the status 
of the system shall be available in the control room (NORSOK, 2008). 
 
Table 5.4. Automatically detect fire 
Name of function Automatically detect fire 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Automatic detection of smoke, heat or flames 
Output Fire automatically detected 
Precondition Detectors deployed and maintained 
Resource Power 
Control Monitoring 
Time N/A 
 
The Output of the <Automatically detect fire> function described in Table 5.4 is automatic 
fire detection. The Input is the presence of smoke, heat or flames in the vicinity of a detector. 
The Precondition is that the detectors are deployed and maintained, thus the <Install and 
maintain> function. The Resource comes from the <Provide emergency power> function. 
Control is exercised via the <Supervise from control room> function. Time is not described 
initially. 
 
Flame detectors are the primary kind of detector for use on a platform but other types are to 
be installed in special locations (NORSOK, 2008). The fire detection system shall be 
functional during a sufficient period of time and the status of the system shall be available in 
the control room. Each detector shall be identifiable in the control room (NORSOK, 2008). 
Deployment, maintenance and calibration of detectors shall ensure early detection (ISO, 
1999). 
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Table 5.5. Manually observe fire 
Name of function Manually observe fire 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Manual observation of smoke, heat, flames 
Output Activation of alarm or both activation of alarm and manual fire fighting 
Precondition N/A 
Resource N/A 
Control Communication 
Time N/A 
 
The Output of the <Manually observe fire> function described in Table 5.5 is either 
<Activate alarm> or both <Activate alarm> and <Fight fire manually>. The Input is a manual 
observation of signs of a fire, hence the <Manually observe fire> function. Control is ensured 
via the <Communicate> function. Precondition, Resource and Time are not described 
initially. 
 
Table 5.6. Provide extinguishing agent 
Name of function Provide extinguishing agent 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Firewater pump running 
Output Firewater to automatic or manual fire fighting 
Precondition Install and maintain 
Resource Water 
Control Monitor development 
Time N/A 
 
The Output of the <Provide extinguishing agent> function described in Table 5.6 is the 
pressurization of the firewater mains to <Fight fire automatically> or <Fight fire manually>. 
The Input comes from a firewater pump that is running, thus the <Start firewater pump> 
function is identified. The Precondition comes from the <Install and maintain> function. The 
Resource required is water. Control is established by the <Supervise from control room> 
function. Time is not described initially. 
 
The main extinguishing agent discussed in standards is firewater (ISO, 1999; NORSOK, 
2008). The supply system shall be dimensioned for the largest fire area and deliver sufficient 
pressure (ISO, 1999). The seawater inlet shall be monitored and measures shall be taken to 
prevent the system from being affected by e.g. marine growth (NORSOK, 2008). 
 
Table 5.7. Supervise from control room 
Name of function Supervise from control room 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Information from all functions that has supervision as control feature 
Output Overview of the situation 
Precondition Communication 
Resource Power 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
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The Output of the <Supervise from control room> function described in Table 5.7 is an 
overview of the situation for the operators. The Input is information from all functions. The 
Precondition is communication via the <Communicate> function. The Resource required is 
power, which is established via <Provide emergency power>. Control and Time are not 
described initially. 
 
Supervision of the development of events is performed in the control room. Activities in the 
control room involve continuous monitoring of the status on the platform. For instance, any 
fire detection or activated alarm shall be visible in the control room (NORSOK, 2008). 
 
Table 5.8. Install and maintain 
Name of function Install and maintain (background function) 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Output Design of system and maintenance routines 
 
The Outputs of the background function <Install and maintain> described in Table 5.8 are the 
design of systems and maintenance routines. The function is guided by the Fire and 
Explosion Strategy (FES) on the platform and the governing regulations. This is a generic 
function that refers to the layout of the platform. With regard to fire fighting, the design shall 
reduce the consequences of a fire by ensuring that functions and equipment are appropriately 
available (NORSOK, 2008). This function is treated differently since it has potential 
couplings to all the other functions. Instead of accounting for it as a stable endpoint in the 
system it is involved in the model and may therefore be subject to variability. 
 
Table 5.9. Provide emergency power 
Name of function Provide emergency power 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Fire is automatically detected or an alarm is activated 
Output Emergency power to consumers 
Precondition Installation and maintenance 
Resource Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) and emergency generator 
Control Monitor power supply 
Time N/A 
 
The Output of the <Provide emergency power> function described in Table 5.9 is emergency 
power to consuming functions. The Input is a fire situation confirmed via <Interpret fire 
detection> or <Activate alarm>. Precondition comes from the <Install and maintain> 
function. Resources are the UPS and the emergency generator. Control is ensured via the 
<Supervise from control room> function. Time is not described initially. 
 
Emergency power system shall be automatically initiated and shall be functional during a 
sufficient period of time (ISO, 1999). Emergency power may be provided by emergency 
generators and/or UPS, power may also be provided by cable from land or other installation 
where suitable (ISO, 1999). 
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Table 5.10. Activate alarm 
Name of function Activate alarm 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Fire automatically detected or manually observed 
Output Audio/visual alarms and signal to the control room 
Precondition Alarms installed and maintained 
Resource Power 
Control Monitor development, communication 
Time N/A 
 
The Outputs of the <Activate alarm> function described in Table 5.10 are audio/visual alarms 
and a signal to the control room via <Supervise from control room>. The Input is either 
<Interpret fire detection> or <Manually observe fire>. Precondition comes from the <Install 
and maintain> function. The Resource is power, which is delivered by the <Provide 
emergency power> function. The function is controlled via <Supervise from control room> 
and <Communicate>. Time is not described initially. 
 
Alarms are activated at fire detection, via manual call points and when a requested action 
fails to execute. An alarm shall be visible in the control room (NORSOK, 2008). The alarm 
should be audible and supported by visual signals in noisy areas (ISO, 1999). Power supply 
to the alarm system shall be ensured via the UPS (NORSOK, 2008). 
 
It shall be possible to activate alarms manually via manual call points and these shall be 
deployed strategically in e.g. (NORSOK, 2008): 
 
• Exits from relevant areas and rooms 
• Escape routes 
• Fire stations 
 
The walking distance to a manual call point shall not exceed 30 meters (NORSOK, 2008). 
 
Table 5.11. Start firewater pump 
Name of function Start firewater pump 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Fire is automatically detected or an alarm is manually activated 
Output Firewater pump running 
Precondition Pump installed and maintained 
Resource Fuel 
Control Remote or local monitoring 
Time N/A 
 
It is assumed that the firewater pump is not running continuously. The Output of the <Start 
firewater pump> function described in Table 5.11 is that the pump is running. The pump 
shall start automatically at a fire detection or activation of an alarm according to ISO 13702 
(ISO, 1999). If the automatic start fails, manual attempts shall be made either remotely or 
locally. The Input is therefore a fire situation confirmed via <Interpret fire detection> or 
<Activate alarm>. The Precondition is that the pump is installed and maintained, hence the 
<Install and maintain> function. The Resource is fuel to run the pump. Control is established 
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via <Supervise from control room> or on-site monitoring via <Communicate>. Time is not 
described initially. 
 
The pump system shall be capable of delivering firewater adequately and during a sufficient 
period of time to the largest possible fire area. The response time of the pump system shall be 
quick enough to ensure firewater supply. The pump shall start automatically at fire detection 
and if the connection to the control room is lost (ISO, 1999). It shall be possible to start the 
pump manually, either locally or from the control room, even if no other system is functional 
on the platform. The fuel tanks shall be large enough to keep the engine running for 18 hours 
(NORSOK, 2008). Fire detection in the pump room should not stop the pump. The pump 
should only stop if hydrocarbons are detected at the air inlet to the engine (ISO, 1999). 
 
Table 5.12. Communicate 
Name of function Communicate 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input From all functions that has communication as control feature 
Output Overview of the situation 
Precondition Communication facilities provided 
Resource Power and information 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
 
The Output of the <Communicate> function described in Table 5.12 is an overview of the 
situation. The Input comes from all functions that have communication as control feature. 
The Precondition is a functional communications system, ensured via the <Install and 
maintain> function. The Resources are power via the <Provide emergency power> function 
and information. Control and Time are not described initially. 
 
Equipment for internal emergency communication shall be provided to ensure means of 
communication between personnel and to control room (NORSOK, 2008). The power supply 
to the communication equipment shall be independent (ISO, 1999). 
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6 Variability,	  functional	  resonance	  and	  instantiations	  
The model that was constructed in the previous chapter shall now be applied in three different 
instantiations. The two initial instantiations are based on reports on accidents involving fire at 
offshore platforms on the Norwegian continental shelf. The third instantiation is a risk 
assessment where the scenario is an unwanted outcome from a function due to performance 
variability. The accidents and the scenario are briefly summarized with a focus on the 
performance of the fire fighting function before an instantiation is developed. The 
instantiations comprises the analysis of variability and functional resonance as well as a 
graphical representation. Conclusions regarding the instantiations of the model are drawn in 
section 6.4. 
 
6.1 Fire	  in	  exhaust	  duct	  from	  main	  generator	  at	  Åsgard	  B	  
The fire occurred on 15 Oct 2005 and took place due to an ignited oil leakage in a heat 
exchanger connected to one of the generators. The fire detection system failed to discover the 
fire and the alarm was initiated by a manual observation. Available fire fighting tools were 
designed in a way that resulted in an insufficient application of firewater against the fire. The 
crew improvised and managed to control the fire and extinguish it anyway (PSA, 2006). 
 
6.1.1 Description	  of	  the	  event	  
The generator had been shut down due to the discovery of oil spills in the vicinity of the 
exhaust duct. A scaffold was in construction with the purpose to gain access to investigate the 
source of the leak. Abnormal smoke emerging from the exhaust duct was observed by the fire 
watch during the construction of the scaffold. Flames were also observed shortly after the 
observation of smoke and at this point the alarm was activated via a manual call point. The 
alarm initiated mustering of personnel and activated the emergency response team. The first 
attempt to fight the fire was with a powder extinguisher and it failed. The firewater monitor 
was manned and engaged shortly after the first extinguishing attempt, it was then discovered 
that the water did not reach the fire as intended. The crew then had to lay out hoses to provide 
water to a portable firewater monitor that could fight the fire from a second front. The hose 
extension took 19 minutes to perform. The application of firewater was now sufficient and 
the fire was extinguished. A minor emergency shutdown was initiated during the event and it 
did not include the start-up of the emergency generator (PSA, 2006). 
 
6.1.2 Variability	  of	  the	  functions	  
The analysis will focus on functions that produced a varying Output. It will show if it was the 
potential variability that became actual or variability due to a varying Output from an 
upstream function. 
 
The automatic fire detection did not detect the fire but it is not made clear why the flame 
detectors did not discover the flames. The fire occurred outdoors and external factors such as 
wind might have affected the detectors ability to see the fire. The first sign of the fire was 
smoke emerging from the exhaust duct and flames were observed shortly after that. Due to 
the early observation of smoke it could also be that the manual observation was faster than 
the detection system. This would imply that there was nothing wrong with the detectors. 
They just needed a more significant sign of the fire before they were able to detect it. This 
explanation suggests that the omission of the automatic fire detection was due to the 
variability of the manual observation and that the quick discovery of the fire was faster than 
the detectors. Alternative explanations are that the detectors were not installed in an optimal 
manner or, as stated above, that external factors such as wind affected their ability to detect 
the fire. 
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The early manual observation is an example of an adaption to the circumstances that led to an 
early activation of the alarm and therefore also the early initiation of manual fire fighting. 
The early detection may have been triggered by the discovery of oil spills. This abnormality 
may have increased the fire watch's attention. 
 
The Output of the manual fire fighting function was subject to variability since the fire was 
hidden from the fixed firewater monitors. The fire fighters had to extend the water supply 
with six hoses before a portable monitor could be engaged from another angle. The reason to 
the variability of the Output was external variability due to the design of the fixed firewater 
monitor system. The fixed monitor system could not cover all the relevant angles and the 
required position of the portable system demanded a very long hose. 
 
With the support of the reasoning above it is possible to identify the couplings related to 
Time during the event. These are accounted for in the graphical representation of the 
instantiation in Figure 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1. Variability of Outputs during the fire at Åsgard B. 
Function Output Variability of Output 
Automatically detect fire Fire automatically detected 
Detection omitted. Probably 
because manual observation 
was quicker or because of 
weather. 
Manually observe fire 
Activation of alarm or both 
activation of alarm and 
manual fire fighting 
Earlier activation of alarm 
and manual fire fighting due 
to increased attention. 
Fight fire manually Extinguishing agent manually applied to fire 
Powder extinguisher was too 
weak to put out fire. 
Firewater monitor pointed in 
the wrong direction and the 
fire was hidden from that 
point of view. 
Portable monitor needed six 
hoses to be placed correctly 
which is too long. 
The hose extension was slow 
and took 19 minutes. 
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6.1.3 Graphical	  representation	  
The instantiation of the fire fighting functions during the event at Åsgard B is represented 
graphically in Figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1. Instantitation of the firefighting functions during the fire at Åsgard B. 
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6.2 Fire	  at	  vent	  stack	  connected	  to	  the	  compressors	  at	  Valhall	  PCP	  
The event occurred on 13 July 2011 and took place due to an ignition of flammable gases 
emerging from a vent stack connected to compressors. The gases were ignited by 
smouldering particles that were produced by a fire in a crane engine room. The particles were 
transported via the exhaust duct out in the open and the wind directed them towards the vents 
(PSA, 2012b). 
 
6.2.1 Description	  of	  the	  event	  
The breakdown of the cooling system and a following heat detector malfunction in a crane 
engine resulted in a fire in the engine room. The crane operator was able to extinguish the fire 
but smouldering particles had already exited the exhaust duct. The muffler was designed to 
prevent smouldering particles from exiting the engine but did not do so. The particles were 
blown by the wind towards a vent stack where flammable gases from the compressors on the 
platform were released into the atmosphere. The gases were ignited and produced a fire 
where the flame height reached three meters and above. The alarm to the control room was 
delivered manually via telephone. The compressor was then stopped which led to an 
increased volume of flammable gases emerging from the vents. Even higher flames followed 
due to the increased volume of gases and this time a flame detector detected the fire. The 
flame detection led to a shutdown of the normal power supply on the platform. No automatic 
means of fire fighting were installed in the area and the situation was considered to dangerous 
to send in fire fighters. The fire was finally extinguished by water cannons mounted on a ship 
(PSA, 2012b). 
 
6.2.2 Variability	  of	  the	  functions	  
The fire at the vent stack was manually observed and the control room was notified by 
telephone. The fire at the vent stack was also automatically detected at a later stage when the 
flames increased in height. The air intake to the crane engine was shut and the engine stopped 
when the fire was automatically detected. This was due to the emergency shutdown when the 
power supply on the platform also was shut off. When the engine stopped, the crane operator 
opened the door to the engine room to investigate why it stopped and discovered the fire. 
This shows that the fire in the crane engine room was manually detected, but not until the 
flames were detected automatically. 
 
Manual detection of the fire in the engine room was delayed due to variability in the 
automatic detection function in the engine room. The heat detection was omitted in this case, 
which made the crane operator believe that everything was normal and he continued working. 
The crane engine should have been shut off automatically on detection of increased 
temperatures. This can be characterized as an automatic fire fighting function, which was also 
omitted. The automatic flame detection responded to the fire at the vent stack roughly four 
minutes after the manual call to the control room, which seems late given the circumstances. 
The crane operator had just secured the crane when emergency shutdown occurred and the 
shutdown made the crane inoperable. Any emergency operation that could have been initiated 
during those four minutes could have been affected when the power suddenly was shut off. 
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Table 6.2. Variability of Outputs during the fire at Valhall PCP. 
Function Output Variability of Output 
Automatically detect fire Fire automatically detected 
Detection was omitted in the 
crane engine room due to a 
malfunctioning heat detector. 
Detection of the flames at the 
vent stack was too late in 
relation to the manual alarm. 
Manually observe fire 
Activation of alarm or both 
activation of alarm and 
manual fire fighting 
The fire at the vent stack was 
detected as required and the 
alarm call was made. 
Fight fire manually Extinguishing agent manually applied to fire 
Omitted because the situation 
was considered to dangerous. 
None of the vents had flash 
back protection. 
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6.2.3 Graphical	  representation	  
The instantiation of the fire fighting functions during the event at Valhall PCP is represented 
graphically in Figure 6.2.
 
Figure 6.2. Instantitation of the firefighting functions during the fire at Valhall PCP. 
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6.3 Risk	  assessment	  of	  a	  scenario	  
Automatic fire detection and automatic fire fighting are omitted in both cases above. 
Therefore it is interesting to create a scenario where these functions are partaking. The 
scenario involves the induction of performance variability in a function that is connected to 
the automatic means of fire fighting to see how the system responds. The scenario is created 
in a way that allows investigation of the performance of the overall fire fighting function 
when its sub functions are subject to variability. It is an imagined situation and it is not 
described according to an actual design of the system in question. The situation is rather 
based on assumptions of how the variability of the Output of a function may contribute to 
functional resonance within the system. 
 
6.3.1 Description	  of	  the	  scenario	  
The scenario is preconditioned by the fact that there is a fire in an area were automatic fire 
detection and fire fighting is installed, e.g. the process area (ISO, 1999). It is then assumed 
that the function intended to interpret the signal from the detection system is subject to 
variability and activates the alarm too late. Suppose that the delayed interpretation of the 
signal is indicated in the control room, i.e. it is communicated that the detector has been 
activated but no signal has been forwarded in the system. According to ISO 13702 it shall be 
possible to manually activate the automatic means of fire fighting (ISO, 1999). Suppose that 
the control room activates the alarm and instructs an operator to initiate the automatic fire 
fighting. The operator is quick and activates the system almost immediately. The start-up of 
the firewater pumps is delayed since it is not initiated until the control room sounds the alarm. 
The pump engine starts at the third automatic start attempt and the pressurization of the fire 
water mains is ensured. At this time the fire fighting system has been active for a while and 
has come to suffer from a loss of pressure. The application of firewater in the area was 
therefore not sufficient initially. The applied water has evaporated and this has created a 
damp and very hot atmosphere in the area, i.e. no manual intervention is possible. The fire is 
extinguished within a minute when the pressure is properly re-established. 
 
6.3.2 Variability	  of	  the	  functions	  
Variability is induced in the function that shall interpret fire detection and forward a signal to 
the control room and the alarm system. The variability of the Output of this function was that 
it was delayed, or even omitted. Since the function is of technical nature, the variability was 
not expected in the way it had been if it were characterized as e.g. human. This is because 
technical features are generally viewed as stable and not subject to frequent variability 
(Hollnagel, 2012). Probable reasons for the variability are either internal or external since it is 
stated in the scenario that the detector functioned as intended. The cause for the variability 
need not to be investigated here since it is a risk assessment of a bigger picture, but possible 
causes may include software malfunction or physical degradation of the function (Hollnagel, 
2012). 
 
The varying Output from the function set to interpret the fire detection resulted in varying 
Inputs to other functions. The fire detection had to be interpreted in the control room, which 
rendered a manual activation of the alarm. The automatic fire fighting had to be initiated 
manually after instructions from the control room. The firewater pumps received the start-up 
signal later than it should have. In addition, the function with the task to start the pumps was 
subject to internal variability that led to a delayed start of the pumps. No manual intervention 
was possible during the loss of pressure due to dangerous conditions in the process area. 
Hence the manual fire fighting functions ability to adapt was nothing worth in this situation. 
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The fire was finally extinguished automatically regardless of the variability in the fire 
fighting function as a whole. 
 
Table 6.3. Variability of Outputs during the risk assessment scenario. 
Function Output Variability of Output 
Interpret fire detection Initiation of automatic fire fighting 
Interpretation of the signal 
from the detector was too 
late, or even omitted. 
Supervise from control 
room Overview of the situation 
Supervisor had to manually 
interpret the fire detection 
and manually activate the 
alarm. The automatic 
interpretation was missing in 
the sequence. 
Fight fire manually Extinguishing agent manually applied to fire 
Omitted because the situation 
was considered to dangerous 
or too late because of the 
delayed activation of the 
alarm. 
Start firewater pump Firewater pump running Too late due to several start attempts. 
Provide extinguishing agent Firewater to automatic or manual fire fighting 
Too weak due to loss of 
pressure in firewater mains. 
Normalized when pressure 
re-established. 
Fight fire automatically Extinguishing agent automatically applied to fire 
Too weak initially because of 
insufficient volume of 
firewater. Normalized when 
water supply re-established. 
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6.3.3 Graphical	  representation	  
The instantiation of the fire fighting functions during the scenario is represented graphically 
in Figure 6.3.
 
Figure 6.3. Instantitation of the firefighting functions during the scenario. 
  
Interpret fire 
detection
P R
I O
T C
Fight fire 
automatically
P R
I O
T C
Fight fire 
manually
P R
I O
T C
Automatically 
detect fire
P R
I O
T C
Manually 
observe fire
P R
I O
T C
Provide 
extinguishing 
agent
P R
I O
T C
Communicate
P R
I O
T C
Activate 
alarm
P R
I O
T C
Start 
firewater 
pump
P R
I O
T C
Supervise 
from control 
room
P R
I O
T C
Provide 
emergency 
power
P R
I O
T C
UPS/Emergency generator
Audio/visual 
signals
Fuel
Smoke, 
heat, 
flames
Water
General precondition
Install  and maintan
Variability
Precondition
Input
Time Control
Output
Resource
Extinguishing agent 
applied to fire
  38 
6.4 Conclusions	  from	  the	  instantiations	  
Human functions are subject to variability frequently. The instantiations of the events show 
that human adaption was necessary in both instantiations concerning past events. It was then 
a question of positive performance variability because without it the situations would not 
have been controlled. In the event at Valhall PCP the automatic detection function rather 
could have interfered with manual efforts due to the delayed detection and the following 
emergency shutdown. The complex interactions seem to increase when redundancy 
counteracts efforts that are initiated at an earlier stage. 
 
Quite surprising it is the variability of Outputs from technical functions that are significant. If 
the unwanted outcomes or the absence of outcomes depend on internal or external variability 
is up for discussion. The technical functions that are included in the overall fire fighting 
function on an offshore platform are not that complicated. Therefore it is more natural to 
assume that variability is due to external factors such as installation and maintenance. These 
are human or organizational background functions that affect the abilities of technical 
functions. 
 
Organizational functions are not identified or described explicitly since fire fighting is 
characterized as work as done, not work as imagined (Hollnagel, 2012). The function 
comprising installation and maintenance describes general preconditions for the performance 
of the safety system. The <Install and maintain> function was though identified as an 
important function because of the impacts of its varying Output in all instantiations. Paying 
respect to background functions is therefore assumed to be essential. 
 
Functional resonance is a property of the system due to varying Outputs in all instantiations. 
It is interesting to see how the functional resonance propagates in different directions within 
the system. A slight variability of an Output of a given function may induce variability in 
several other functions. These may in turn deliver a varying Output. Hence the non-linearity 
of the interdependencies is visualized during the analysis. The functional resonance also 
generates couplings that were not identified as potential, for instance when the <Interpret fire 
detection> function was bypassed and the detection had to be interpreted in the control room 
during the risk assessment scenario. 
 
The concepts of variability and functional resonance catch the essence of complex 
interactions within the system. The actual couplings that emerge during the instantiations are 
though uncertain to some extent. They are a product of the interpretation of a scenario and 
therefore subjectively motivated. There may be arguments for a different interpretation that 
renders a different instantiation but this is one of the exciting features of the modelling of 
complex systems (Cilliers, 2005). 
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7 Discussion	  
The approach in this thesis is quite simple: 
 
1. Identify required characteristics of a method applied to interpret dependencies 
2. Apply a method that conforms to those requirements 
3. Evaluate the application of that method 
 
This chapter comprises discussions on the outcomes of the analysis and reflections on the 
analytical process in this thesis. The discussion on the approach in the literature study and the 
findings it rendered is rather short and will be accounted for initially.  
 
7.1 Reflections	  on	  the	  theoretical	  background	  
The fundamental work for this thesis was to identify the required characteristics of a method 
used to interpret interdependencies in a barrier system. The approach was quite polarizing 
and aimed to highlight differences between different concepts. The major distinctions were 
accounted for and may be summarized as follows: Decomposition vs. Holism, Linearity vs. 
Non-linearity, Resultant vs. Emergent and Energy vs. Complexity. No deeper introduction 
was provided to the notions of active failures and latent conditions in the Swiss cheese model. 
These are complex features of that model and it could have been fairer to describe them as 
such. The approach was though assumed to be sufficient with regard to the purpose of this 
thesis. 
 
According to Perrow (1984), dependencies can be characterized by the concepts of complex 
interactions and couplings. The severity of these features then defines the risk level in the 
system as a product of complexity. It is quite remarkable that the issue of complex 
interactions has not been attended to more extensively. The concept can be traced back to the 
same era as the energy release theory, the latter then underwent a development that later led 
to the barrier concept. Perrow's introduction of the normal accident theory seems to have 
been an event that brought the concept of complex interactions back on the agenda. The 
awareness of the implications of complex interactions has probably increased ever since, but 
there seem to have been difficulties to operationalize the concept. These difficulties were 
present during the application of the FRAM in this thesis and will be discussed below. 
 
7.2 Outcomes	  of	  the	  analysis	  
Safety management within the Norwegian offshore industry has developed in the spirit of the 
Swiss cheese model. This model represents a linear thinking of symmetrical cause and effect 
relationships, meaning that it does not provide sufficient analytical tools for interpretation of 
dependencies. The construction of a defence in depth that conforms to the philosophy of the 
Swiss cheese model may rather increase the complexity in the safety system. Hence it also 
increases the potential for normal accidents. The question was if interdependencies in barrier 
systems constitute a problem that is essential to approach. This is also a question of whether 
the PSA focuses on a relevant issue when they prioritize the matter of interdependencies in 
barrier systems. 
 
The outcomes of the analysis show that complex interactions within the barrier system may 
give rise to unanticipated interdependency. The relatively small case study in this thesis 
indicates that it is essential to approach the issue of interdependencies in barrier systems. The 
governing safety management philosophy does not attend to this matter sufficiently. When a 
safety system is designed, each barrier in a defence in depth is metaphorically represented by 
a slice of Swiss cheese. The holes in the slices are quite well evaluated, i.e. certain properties, 
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such as size and position, have been defined. For instance, if the barrier is of technological 
nature, then the properties of the holes are defined by failure frequencies or probabilities. In 
an illustrative event tree the slices of cheese would be the nodes and the properties of the 
holes would be represented by the probability of failure assigned to each node. This approach 
is analytically valuable to some extent since the reliability of technical functions indeed is 
important. Though, it does not account for the relationships between the holes in a slice or 
between holes in different slices. These relationships can be viewed as the interdependencies 
in the barrier system. Knowledge of the properties of the holes has to be considered 
insufficient if risk is assumed to be a product of complexity. This is the issue that has been 
approached in this thesis. 
 
The FRAM analysis illustrates the implications of the interdependencies in the system during 
two events as they happened and one risk assessment scenario. The analysis of 
interdependencies in the barrier system is therefore based on an event that occurs during the 
operational phase. The design of the barrier system is though, as previously stated, based on 
linear thinking. The outcomes of the analysis imply that it may be necessary to involve an 
assessment of interdependencies already in the design phase. Enhancement of the ability to 
manage interdependencies is therefore not considered a matter of choosing between 
philosophies. It is rather about incorporating the assessment of interdependencies in the 
safety management strategy at an early stage. 
 
The incorporation of interdependency assessment is considered a way to reduce negative 
effects of redundancy and to make interactions anticipated rather than unanticipated. Hence it 
is believed that greater attention to interdependencies promotes consistency of actions taken 
during an event. The instantiation of the event at Valhall PCP showed that human and 
technological functions might counteract each other in unanticipated ways. Such interactions 
may create potentially dangerous situations when the conditions for an on-going manual 
intervention suddenly change. The instantiations of the two events also showed that human 
variability was necessary during the efforts to control the situation. Perhaps it is time to start 
relying on the human ability to adapt instead of implementing technological functions in 
excess. At least the technological functions should be controlled when manual actions are 
initiated since they may obstruct positive human performance variability. 
 
The matter of interdependencies is considered to deserve the prioritization from the PSA. 
However, it is interesting to note that is a focus area during the year of 2013, this shows that 
the industry and the governing body are slow to adapt. The perception that complex 
interactions have impacts on the performance of a barrier system is approximately thirty 
years old, at least.  
 
7.3 Evaluation	  of	  the	  application	  of	  the	  FRAM	  
It was concluded early in the work process that a thorough FRAM analysis cannot and should 
not be performed by a single person. This is also acknowledged by Hollnagel (2012, p. 53). It 
was then decided to focus on the essentials of the methodology to be able to evaluate the 
application of the FRAM generally rather than to scrutinize each step of the method. 
 
It was the explicit wish in this thesis to focus on interdependencies in a system and some 
difficulties were experienced during the process. The difficulties were not related to the 
comprehension of complex interactions and couplings. The variability and functional 
resonance were tools that allowed interpretation of them within the frames of the FRAM. The 
difficulties were rather related to issues that arise when a system is defined as complex. 
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Hence it was not a problem to analyse the modelled system, the problem was rather related to 
the construction of the model via the identification of functions. 
 
7.3.1 Identification	  and	  description	  of	  functions	  
Hollnagel (2012, p. 42) states that the identification of functions may start with any function, 
anywhere in a system. This means that the level of detail (treated as synonymous to degree of 
decomposition) in the description of the first function preconditions the identification of other 
functions. The boundaries of the analysis were therefore strongly depending on the level of 
detail in the descriptions. If the descriptions of the functions are used as a tool to identify 
additional functions, as was the case in the analysis in this thesis, then the boundary of the 
system (or the overall function) is defined with regard to the functions. To use the FRAM 
language: The variability of the Output of the <Identify and describe the functions> function 
induces variability in the function <Set the boundaries for the analysis>. A more detailed 
description of the functions simply narrows the space of analysis since the boundaries tend to 
move inward as the Outputs of the functions becomes more detailed. If the task is to perform 
a detailed analysis of a system with the same boundaries as a less detailed analysis, then it is 
probably required that the boundaries are set in advance. On the other hand, if the level of 
detail is too superficial with regard to boundaries that are set in advance, then the system will 
probably miss essential functions when the identification is done. However, the system would 
no longer be defined as open to the surrounding environment if the boundaries were set in 
advance. This contradicts one of the basic attributes of a complex system (Cilliers, 2005). 
 
The identification had to be constrained in this thesis. Therefore the modelled fire fighting 
function can only be viewed as semi-complex. Hence the concept of decomposition was 
present during the application of the non-linear systemic method in this thesis. The limiting 
condition was of course that the model had to be workable. It is though important to verify 
that the chosen level of detail really adds something to the bigger picture. To trivial 
descriptions tend to render a quite obvious analysis that requires no previous knowledge of 
the workings of a risk assessment. 
 
The tight coupling between the descriptions of the functions and the boundaries of the system 
was an issue during the application of the FRAM. It is stated in Hollnagel (2012, p. 59) that 
the identification should come to a halt when a function is identified as stable with regard to 
the system. But this was a highly subjective task. With a little imagination it would have been 
easy to continue the identification in excess. Variability can probably be found in any 
function and this means that the built-in stop feature in the FRAM model is rather weak. This 
is though one of the challenges with the modelling of a complex system and as Cilliers 
(2005) stated; the description of a system always rely on the individual describing it. 
 
The FRAM was applied with the precondition that it was a fire in progress somewhere on the 
offshore platform. Hence the primary approach was a risk assessment but the model that was 
constructed with the support of this condition was then tried in three instantiations. It is 
therefore a slight modification of the FRAM since it is stated that it should always be applied 
with a specific purpose (Hollnagel, 2012, p. 36). To state that there is a fire in progress 
somewhere on the platform is not assumed to be specific enough. Perhaps it was the approach 
in this thesis that was too generic but the difficulties are believed to be present whenever a 
risk assessment is to be performed in general. If the task is an accident investigation there is 
probably a different basis to rely on. The problem then could be that the identification of 
functions may rely too heavily on available descriptions of the accident (Hollnagel, 2012, p. 
37). It may then be hard to distinguish the use of the FRAM from a conventional linear cause 
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and effect-modelling tool. The balancing between unbiased descriptions of the functions and 
significance of non-linearity in the model is believed to be a dilemma. 
 
7.3.2 Variability,	  functional	  resonance	  and	  instantiations	  
Variability of the functions, variability of the Outputs of the functions and the aggregation of 
variability, i.e. the functional resonance, were analysed in instantiations of the model. This 
was also when some of the potential couplings within the system were concretized into actual 
couplings. The strengths of the FRAM were manifested during the instantiations. The 
concepts of variability and functional resonance are easy to comprehend and facilitate the 
visualization of dependencies during the analysis. The variability of an Output was always 
described on an ordinal scale that referred to an anticipated Output from the function in 
question. This facilitated the transition to the function receiving the varying Output as an 
input, i.e. the downstream function. It may seem trivial but tells a lot about how a function's 
performance variability may propagate within a system and induce functional resonance.  
 
Perrow's notions of complex interactions and coupling can be translated into the FRAM's 
notion of actual couplings. The actual couplings in an instantiation of the FRAM model show 
both connections that were not foreseen and the level of dependency, i.e. if the coupling is 
tight or loose. A function that is affected by a varying Output from an upstream function may 
vary differently depending on which upstream function that is involved. The function may 
also react differently depending on which aspect that is receiving the varying input. These 
two properties demonstrate the level of coupling between to functions. Hence Perrow's 
notions are clearly present when the FRAM is applied for analysis. 
 
There is one cautionary reflection to account for even though the instantiations were 
comprehensible tasks to perform. When the actual couplings are analysed, it is easy to get 
carried away and see an awful lot of couplings everywhere. For the analysis to be valuable 
and consistent it is assumed that a critical perspective should be adopted during the 
instantiations. This leads to another important reflection, namely that a lone analyst should 
not conduct a FRAM analysis. Since the FRAM is overall qualitative it is assumed that 
discussions involving several competent individuals are the most efficient and thorough way 
of conducting the analysis. 
 
7.4 Validation	  of	  the	  FRAM	  model	  and	  focus	  group	  discussion	  
A visit to the DNV headquarter outside Oslo was made as part of the process of this thesis. 
The combined experience within offshore safety is large at DNV and it is valuable to be able 
to involve a perspective from reality in the thesis. The intention was to discuss the reasoning 
in this thesis and validate the identified functions during a meeting with experienced 
professionals. As it turned out, there is a process at DNV that involves the search for suitable 
methods to apply when analysing dependencies. The actuality of the issue at the company 
rendered rewarding discussions. 
 
The idea was basically to match the theoretical modelling of a system on an offshore platform 
with actual experience too see if it was principally correct. The idea was also to contrast 
between a theoretical perspective and a professional perspective, it was a bit of a surprise that 
our views conformed quite well. The inventory of identified functions related to fire fighting 
were validated during the discussions. Hence the FRAM model turned out to be principally 
correct in spite of the difficulties that were experienced during the identification. In addition 
to that, there was an agreement on the need to reflect on the limitations. This was in line with 
the previous discussion on the coupling between the identification and the system boundaries. 
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However, a few topics emerged as particularly interesting during the discussions. Some of 
these may be suitable for future research and they are accounted for in the upcoming section. 
 
7.5 Future	  research	  
Suggestions to future research emerged both during the thesis work and during the 
discussions at DNV. The ideas will be accounted for briefly in this section. 
 
• The coupling between the identification of functions and the system boundaries need 
to be explored. Is it, for instance, possible to attempt to create a common conceptual 
framework regarding the identification of functions and the required level of detail in 
the descriptions? How should limitations and the connections to the system boundary 
be handled in an optimal manner? 
 
• Is it possible to incorporate a grading of the criticality of the functions in the analysis? 
Functions experiencing similar variability and having similar couplings can be of 
different significance to the system as a whole. It is probably a demanding rating to 
perform, experience and knowledge of the actual design of a system is assumed to be 
essential. May provide guidance on prioritizing between functions and may have large 
practical impact. 
 
• How does functions with reduced capacity affect the conditions for the analysis? All 
functions are probably not delivering as intended all the time. Also, how do actions 
taken during a deviancy to get back to normal affect the variability and functional 
resonance? 
 
• The consequences of the analysis will in one way form an input to the functions. How 
can this be accounted for? Actions taken due to results of the analysis will be a game 
change for the system. It is assumed throughout in this thesis that the system is 
complex, which implies that there is continuous adaption and several mutual 
processes within the system. 
 
• How does the petroleum exploration in more extreme environments affect the 
variability of functions? Will an installation in e.g. the Arctic require more 
performance variability due to demanding environments? 
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8 Conclusion	  
The first question concerned the need to approach interdependencies in barrier systems. The 
safety management strategies within the industry have been developed in the spirit of the 
Swiss cheese model. It is a complex linear accident model that involves the use of barriers to 
strengthen safety. This kind of accident model is also denoted as an epidemiological model. It 
was concluded that models of this kind are incapable to provide tools for interpretation of 
dependencies within a system. The governing philosophy is therefore not considered 
sufficient when risk is perceived to be a product of complex interactions. Hence there is a 
need to approach the issue of interdependencies in barrier systems. Assessment of 
interdependencies should be incorporated in the system design phase. The incorporation is 
assumed to reduce the frequency of unanticipated interactions. With regard to this, the PSA 
prioritizes a matter that is important to the performance of barrier systems. It is though 
noteworthy that the impacts of complex interactions have been discussed for approximately 
thirty years. 
 
The second research question concerned the required characteristics of a method to apply 
when the task is to interpret dependencies. This question was satisfactory answered during 
the literature studies, the method should: 
 
• Apply a holistic perspective and account for non-linearity 
• See risk as an emerging feature that is a product of complexity  
 
The third question concerned the impressions from the application of a method that conforms 
to those the requirements. The application of the FRAM showed that it still has some 
development to undergo. The reflections from the application are of dual nature. On one hand 
the structure and purpose of the method is easy to understand. The FRAM does on the other 
hand not adequately address issues that arise since the system to be modelled is complex. 
That is because the construction of the FRAM model via the identification of functions is 
very uncertain. 
 
The overall impression from the application of the FRAM is that it is an interesting and 
promising method. The concepts of variability and functional resonance are comprehensible 
for anyone, which indeed is good and makes the method more accessible. It is also possible 
to see the connections to Perrow's complex interactions and couplings during the 
instantiations of the FRAM model. It is though important that the FRAM model is reliable 
since it constitutes the preconditions for the analysis of variability and functional resonance. 
The construction of the model and hence the boundaries of the system via the identification 
of functions should be subject to continued development.  
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